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Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection:  
Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder 
protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an 
inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker governance 
experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did 
firms with stronger governance.  This evidence indicates that securities-market regulation can be effective 
in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country with weak judicial enforcement. We 
also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the new regulations, 
suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where 
block holders have strong political connections. 
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Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: 
Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Recent studies of corporate ownership around the world have found that diffuse ownership is 
relatively uncommon and most corporations are controlled by large block holders (see, e.g., La Porta, 
Lopez-di-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), La Porta, Lopez-di-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and 
Holderness (2008). Consequently, the primary concern of corporate governance has broadened from 
mitigating the agency conflicts between firm managers and diffuse shareholders (Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)) to protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by a controlling 
block holder and her management team (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Johnson, La Porta, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000)).1   
In discussing needed governance reforms, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2000) suggest that countries change the “rules and enforcement mechanisms” for protecting investors 
“towards some successful standard,”—a process they refer to as “legal convergence.”  La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) support this guidance by demonstrating that firms in countries 
with better investor protection are more valuable than firms in countries with poorer investor protection.   
In this study, we examine the market reactions to three examples of “legal convergence” that 
occurred in China when the government’s Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) 
introduced new regulations aimed at reducing expropriation from minority shareholders by controlling 
block holders. The three regulations were all introduced in the second quarter of 2000 and were partly 
motivated by China’s successful attempt to gain entrance into the World Trade Organization.  The first 
new regulation substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual 
Shareholders’ Meeting. Most importantly, the new regulation prohibited shareholders involved in related 
                                                 
1
 Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Denis and McConnell (2003) provide surveys of the literature on international 
corporate governance. 
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party trading from voting on the related party trading. The second regulation prohibited the issuance of 
loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling shareholder, and the third regulation improved the 
transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related parties.2   
Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), we use standard event-study methodology to 
analyze the link between investor protection and firm value, thereby reducing potential endogeneity 
problems inherent in the use of cross-sectional regressions.  The causality between shareholder protection 
and firm value is clear: value changes, if any, are the result of the market’s assessment that corporate 
governance has improved, reducing expected future expropriation of minority shareholders.  
The prediction that share prices increase around the introduction of the new regulations assumes 
that the new regulations will be enforced by the regulator. This is consistent with the theoretical model of 
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), which predicts that, in emerging markets with relatively weak legal 
systems, regulators can provide an effective substitute for ineffective judicial enforcement. An alternative 
view is that the new regulations will not be enforced or will be enforced selectively, favoring companies 
with strong links to the government. If this is the case, we expect to see no or only a weak price reaction 
around the introduction of the new regulations, especially for firms most closely linked to the Chinese 
government.  
The first part of our empirical analysis provides evidence of a ten-percent positive share market 
reaction around the introduction of the first regulation. This finding offers support for the model of La 
Porta et al. (2002, p.1168), which predicts that “poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower 
valuations.”  The market-wide price reactions around the second and third events are also positive but 
statistically insignificant. We discuss several reasons why our tests of market-wide price reactions might 
                                                 
2
  The regulatory changes reflect the commitment of the Chinese government to improve corporate governance.  The 
World Bank (2002, p. 102) concludes that “corporate governance has moved to the center stage of enterprise reform 
in China,” and (p. 1) that many of the requirements for listed companies are “even stricter than in Hong Kong and 
other developed markets…and show the authorities’ determination to protect minority shareholders.” 
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have limited power to test the impact of the regulatory events. The most important reason is that the 
regulations might have benefited only specific subsets of firms—for example, firms with the weakest 
governance or firms with the weakest ties to the government.  
Consequently, we focus on cross-sectional models in the remainder of our analysis, utilizing the 
expected differential reactions to the regulations by different subsets of firms. More specifically, we test 
the hypothesis that effective regulation will result in larger value increases for minority shareholders of 
firms that are more likely to be subject to expropriation by controlling block holders.  
In our first set of cross-sectional tests, we use the total value of all potentially damaging related-
party transactions occurring during the year before the regulations were introduced as a proxy for the 
degree of expropriation from minority shareholders. 3  Around all three events, we find that minority 
shareholders in firms with higher total values of related-party transactions experienced significantly larger 
abnormal returns than minority shareholders in firms with lower or zero total value of related-party 
transactions.  This is strong evidence that investors perceived the regulations as effective.  
We also find that, for the group of firms with the most direct ties to the Chinese government, 
abnormal returns are unrelated to the value of related party transactions. This latter result suggests that 
investors were skeptical that the CSRC—a State-controlled regulator—would enforce the new regulations 
at firms with close ties to the government.  
Our second set of cross-sectional tests analyze the relation between abnormal returns and less 
direct measures of expropriation by the controlling block holder, such as the cash-flow rights and identity 
of the controlling block holder, the presence of foreign shareholders, and the total shareholding of non-
controlling block holders. Our results suggest that minority shareholders of firms with weak corporate 
governance benefit disproportionately from the new regulations in the form of higher abnormal returns. 
                                                 
3
 Related-party transactions include transactions between the listed company and either its large shareholders or 
entities controlled by those shareholders. 
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This finding is consistent with the argument in Klapper and Love (2003) that shareholders of firms with 
weak governance are more reliant upon legal and regulatory protection from expropriation by controlling 
block holders. Moreover, consistent with the notion that regulators selectively enforce the new 
regulations, we find that minority shareholders in firms with private controlling block holders enjoy the 
largest value increases around the announcement of the new regulations.  
We contribute to the literature in at least four ways. First, we contribute to the literature on 
regulation as a substitute for judicial enforcement (La Porta et al. (2000), Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 
(2001), Klapper and Love (2003)). Using robust event-study methodology, we find significant positive 
abnormal returns accrue to firms with weak governance as proxied by the value of related-party 
transactions and a variety of less direct measures. We interpret these results as evidence that securities-
market regulation can be effective in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation in a country 
with weak judicial enforcement 
Second, we contribute to the literature on “tunneling” (Johnson et al. (2000)) that analyzes 
related-party transactions between listed firms and their controlling block holders (Cheung, Jin, Rau and 
Stouraitis (2007), Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003)). 
We use the value of related-party transactions to calculate our proxy for the degree of expropriation by 
controlling block holders and provide evidence that regulations designed to protect minority shareholders 
disproportionately benefited firms with higher values of related-party transactions. 
Third, we contribute to the literature on the importance of political connections (Fisman (2001), 
Johnson and Mitton (2003), Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006), Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007), and 
Cheung et al. (2007)). We provide new evidence that, in a country with a weak judicial system, such as 
China, investors are skeptical that regulators will undertake actions that might harm controlling block 
holders with strong political connections. Specifically, we find that announcements of regulations 
designed to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling block holders led to greater 
increases in value at firms with private block holders than at firms with government block holders, with 
market-oriented State-owned enterprises block holders falling in between.   
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Finally, we contribute to the growing body of work on corporate governance in China (Sun and 
Tong (2003), Cull and Xu (2005), Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005), Fan, Wong 
and Zhang (2005, 2007))—especially the group of studies that have abandoned the “official” ownership 
scheme, which classifies owners of non-tradable shares primarily into two categories—State Shares and 
Legal-Person Shares—in favor of classifications based upon the identity of the ultimate owner (Firth, 
Fung and Rui (2006), Berkman, Cole and Fu (2007, 2009), Chen, Firth and Xu (2009)).    
In the remainder of the article, we proceed as follows. Section 2 describes some of the salient 
institutional details of the Chinese share markets, while Section 3 describes each of the three regulatory 
changes designed to improve the protection of minority shareholders. In Section 4, we describe our data 
and methodology and develop our hypotheses. In Section 5, we present our results, which are followed by 
a summary and conclusions in Section 6. 
 
II. Institutional Details of the Chinese Share Markets 
During the 1990s, the Chinese government corporatized and partially privatized almost a 
thousand State-owned enterprises (SOEs) through share-issuance privatizations on the two primary 
Chinese stock exchanges—the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). The corporatization and share-issuance privatization of large SOEs were central elements of the 
Chinese strategy towards creation of a “modern-enterprise system.”4 
In China, there are two official types of controlling block holders: holders of State shares and 
holders of Legal-Person shares. State shares are those held by government agencies (e.g., the Bureau of 
State Property Management and local finance bureaus) and by some types of corporatized SOEs. Legal-
Person (LP) shares are those owned by domestic corporations or other non-individual legal persons. Like 
                                                 
4
 Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) coin the term “share-issuance privatizations.” Sun and Tong (2003) 
evaluate the changes in financial performance of Chinese firms following their share-issuance privatizations. 
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State shares, Legal-Person shares cannot be traded on the two exchanges or transferred to foreign 
investors, but can be transferred to domestic corporations, when approved by the CSRC. 
Individuals and domestic corporations are allowed to hold Tradable-A shares. Tradable-A shares 
are the only type of equity that can be publicly traded among domestic investors. Since December 16, 
1996, both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have used a daily price limit of 10% based on 
the previous day’s closing price for each stock. In this study, the market price of a listed company refers 
to the price of Tradable-A shares, and the prices of such shares are used to measure the valuation effects 
of the regulations aimed at improving the protection of minority shareholders.5  
Regulators typically required that Tradable-A shares account for more than 25% of total 
outstanding shares when a company went public.  Until July 1999, individuals were prohibited 
from holding more than 0.5% of total shares outstanding for any listed company; subsequently, 
the legal maximum for individual shareholders was increased to 5.0%. The legal maximum for 
individual shareholdings and the absence of cumulative voting procedures significantly enhance 
the control rights of a firm’s largest shareholder. The World Bank (2002, p. xiii), concluded that, 
in China, “. . . large shareholders often overstep the bounds of shareholder meetings and boards 
of directors and exercise direct effective control.”  
There are serious shortcomings in the official share classification for any analysis of 
corporate governance at listed firms in China. To illustrate the confusion, we refer to Table 5 in 
Delios, Wu and Zhou (2006), where the authors report the overlap between their 17 (ultimate) 
ownership categories and the official Share Classification. For example, of the 556 times a State 
                                                 
5
 In addition to domestic shares, some firms have issued foreign shares (B-, H- and N-shares). B-shares are available 
to foreign investors and are traded on the two domestic exchanges, whereas H- and N-shares have an overseas 
listing. The governance structure for firms with an overseas listing is more restrictive, and we exclude firms with H- 
or N-shares from our later tests (see Xu and Wang, 1999). 
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Asset Management Bureau (SAMB) was classified as a top-10 shareholder of a listed firm in 
their sample, the SAMB was officially classified as holder of State shares 105 times (19%), as a 
Legal Person shareholder 221 times (40%), and, in 230 cases, as Tradable-A shareholder or 
“Other”. Similarly, private corporations were officially classified as holders of State shares in 
7.4% of the cases, as holder of Legal-Person shares in 59.8% of the cases, and as holder of 
Tradable-A shares or “Other” in 32.8% of the cases.  
Because of these ambiguities, we adopt the classification scheme of Chinese ownership 
developed by the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) Business School and described in Delios et 
al. (2006). NUS staff has analyzed the top ten block holders of each publicly traded Chinese firm over the 
period 1994 – 2002, and categorized each into one of 17 detailed categories. NUS has generously made 
these ownership data publicly available.6 
Based upon NUS’ detailed classifications, we define three broad groups of ultimate owners. The 
groups are as follows (where we reference the Delios, Wu and Zhou (2006) detailed-classification number 
in parentheses).  
State Bureaucrats includes central government (1); local governments (2); government ministries 
(3); government bureaus (4); State asset-investment bureaus (6); State asset-management bureaus 
(7); State research institutes (10); and State-owned banks (16).  
Market-Oriented SOEs includes companies that formerly were government ministries (5); 
market-oriented state-owned enterprises (9); and infrastructure-construction companies (8).  
Private Entities includes security companies (11); investment funds (12); private companies (13); 
private individuals (14); foreign companies and individuals (15); and work unions (17).  
                                                 
6
 The ownership data constructed by Delios et al. (2006) are available for download 
from http://www.bschool.nus.edu.sg/staff/bizakd/owner.htm. The 17 detailed ownership classifications are described 
in Delios (2006), which documents the downloadable database. 
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We define these three broad groupings based on the closeness of the block holder’s ties to the 
government, as well as upon the incentives and experience of the block holders. State Bureaucrats have 
the most direct ties to the State, as these block holders are (an integral part of) the government, 
government agencies, or government institutions. MOSOEs have the next closest ties to the State, as they 
are controlled by the State, but have been through a transition towards the market-oriented structure of 
for-profit organizations. Private Entities have the least direct ties to the State, in that their management is 
controlled by private firms and/or investors, even if the State has a partial ownership stake. 
Beyond their closeness to the State, these three broad groupings also differ with respect to 
incentives and experience. State Bureaucrats typically have the least experience in running a company 
and are less concerned about the profits of the firm. MOSOEs are corporations with more experience in 
running a company and a stronger focus on profit-maximization. Private Entities have the greatest 
incentive to maximize profits because they receive the greatest degree of rewards based upon financial 
performance. 
III. Regulations to Improve Minority Shareholder Protection 
In China, minority-shareholders enjoy only moderate legal protection against expropriation. 
Based on the index of investor protection developed by La Porta et al. (1999), MacNeil (2002) calculates 
an index score of two for China compared with a world average of three and a maximum of six. Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) construct an index of ex-post private control of self-
dealing, and calculate a value of 0.53 for China as compared with a 0.52 world average.  
The CSRC is designated as the regulator for securities activities. The CSRC has wide-ranging 
powers in respect of authorization, rule-making, investigation and enforcement of all aspects of the 
securities markets (see Zhu (2000)). The regulatory changes that we study were the first substantial 
improvement in minority-shareholder protection implemented by the CSRC, and suggest an increased 
willingness by the Chinese leadership to subordinate the interests of controlling block holders (usually the 
State) to the interests of other shareholders (MacNeil (2002) and World Bank (2002)). Consistent with the 
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argument in Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), we expect that the regulation and enforcement by a 
specialized and relatively efficient regulator is an effective substitute for judicial enforcement.7 
The three regulatory changes we study were announced within a two-month period during early 
2000. We briefly review each regulation in this section and refer the reader to Appendix I for a more 
detailed description of each. 
The first event is the introduction of a regulation that substantially increased the voting rights of 
minority shareholders at shareholder meetings. Among other things, this new regulation: prohibited 
shareholders involved in related party trading from voting at the shareholding meetings on the related 
party trading; empowered small shareholders to propose motions at a firm’s shareholders Annual 
Meeting; required that candidates for directors be voted on individually rather than as a group; and 
granted new legal standing in Chinese courts to shareholders disputing procedures used or resolutions 
passed at a firm’s Annual Meeting. 
The second regulation prohibited a listed firm from issuing a loan guarantee to its controlling 
shareholder or related party. The third regulation greatly improved the transparency and regulation of 
asset transfers to related parties. 
We expect the strongest market reaction to the first regulation since it is likely to have the 
greatest element of surprise and to have the widest impact because it affects all kinds of related-party 
transactions. The second and third regulation reinforced the signal to the market from the first regulation 
that the Chinese government was committed to improve corporate governance. In addition, these last two 
regulations are easy to monitor, and reduce the ability of controlling block holders to expropriate minority 
                                                 
7
 Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui (2005) argue that the CSRC is not a “toothless tiger.” They show enforcement actions by 
the CSRC result in negative stock returns, more frequent auditor changes and more frequent CEO dismissal. Chen, 
Firth, Gao and Rui (2006) report a marked increase in regulatory enforcement cases by the CSRC, rising from a total 
of only 18 in 1999 to a total of 69 in 2001. 
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shareholders in a very direct way. The following sections examine the effects of the introduction of the 
new regulations on the value of Tradable-A shares in the Chinese share markets.  
IV. Methodology and Data 
We use standard event-study methodology to analyze the link between investor protection and 
firm value. In addition to reducing potential endogeneity problems inherent in the use of cross-sectional 
regressions that relate investor protection to firm value, event studies analyze the change in value for the 
same sample of firms before and after the changes in the regulatory environment. As a result, we do not 
need to control for firm heterogeneity. A disadvantage of our approach is that market participants might 
anticipate the regulatory changes, in which case our results provide only a partial estimate of the value 
changes resulting from improving corporate governance.  
   A. Market-Wide Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
To test the overall market impact of the new regulations, we form an equally weighted portfolio 
of all 887 sample firms (see below) and analyze the cumulative abnormal returns around the event. Our 
event window is taken from one day before the CSRC release of the new regulations until one day after 
the regulation was first published in the newspaper (Appendix I lists the exact dates for each event). We 
choose this definition of the event period, which results in relatively long event windows, based on our 
observation that share prices react around both the initial CSRC release day and the subsequent 
newspaper announcement. We conjecture that the prolonged reaction is the result of the initial release to a 
limited number of market participants including the securities regulatory offices, the stock exchanges, and 
the listed companies. The restricted release makes it likely that many, if not most, minority shareholders 
receive the information only after publication in the newspapers.  
We estimate two models to test the market-wide price reaction to the regulatory changes. First, 
we estimate the cumulative mean-adjusted returns around each event using the following model: 
(1)                  MARKET RETURN t = β 0   +  Σ β J  EVENT J  +  ε t ,  J  =  1 to 3     
 
where:  
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MARKET RETURN t is the return for day t on the equally weighted market portfolio of firms 
only listed on the Chinese stock exchanges;8  
β0 is the mean portfolio return during the sample period; 
EVENT
 J, J = 1 to 3, are dummy variables that equal 1 / n J for the dates within the event window 
of length n J days for the Jth regulation, and 0 otherwise, where n1 = 11, n2 = 10 and n3 = 23;9   
β
 J, J = 1 to 3, are the estimated cumulative mean-adjusted returns during each event window J;  
ε
 t is an i.i.d. random-error term for day t. 
Second, as a robustness check intended to control for market-wide price movements unrelated to 
the regulations, we estimate a model that includes the contemporaneous return on an equally weighted 
portfolio of 24 firms from China that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HK RETURN t).10 
The empirical model is:
 
(2)  MARKET RETURN t = β 0  +  Σ β J   EVENT J  +  β 4  HK RETURN t  +  ε t  
  
where: 
HK RETURN t is the return for day t on the equally weighted portfolio of 24 firms from China 
that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and 
                                                 
8
 When we use a value-weighted market index, we find similar results. 
9
 We define the dummy variable as equal to 1/n, where n is the length of the event window, so that the coefficient on 
our dummy variable measures the cumulative adjusted return over the entire event window.  Were we to define the 
dummy variable as equal to 1, then the coefficient would instead measure the average daily adjusted return over the 
event window. 
10
 These firms have their headquarters and business activities in mainland China, but their shares are only listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We expect that the new regulations are of little importance to these firms, as 
Chinese companies with an overseas listing are subject to additional provisions in their articles of association that 
already substantially limited the power of their controlling shareholders. MacNeil (2002, p. 51) argues that the 
amendments in the articles of overseas listed firms “should be viewed as a considerable enhancement of the 
governance structure by comparison with domestic-only listed Chinese companies.”   
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MARKET RETURN t, β0, EVENT J, β J and ε t are defined as above. 
We estimate each model over a period of 250 trading days that ends July 25, 2000—one day after the 
newspaper release of the asset transfer regulation (event 3).  
As another test of robustness, we re-estimate equation (1) and equation (2) where we redefine the 
event windows to incorporate, for each regulation, two five-day event windows centered on the CSRC 
release date and first publication date. This shortens the length of our event windows so as to limit the 
effects of potentially confounding events. We refer to these as Five-day Event Windows whereas we refer 
to our primary windows as Long Event Windows. 11  
B. Cross-Sectional Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In addition to testing market-wide changes in value attributable to improved shareholder 
protection, we also test whether the new regulations have differential impacts on firms depending on the 
extent to which minority shareholders might be expropriated by the controlling block holders. We expect 
that firms where minority shareholders face greater expropriation should disproportionately benefit from 
the new regulations. In our first set of cross-sectional tests, we use the total value of the related-party 
transactions in the year preceding the announcement of the new regulations as an observable proxy for 
(potential) minority shareholder expropriation. We refer to this measure as EXPROP. We hypothesize 
that, during the event windows, firms with high values of EXPROP outperform firms with low values of 
EXPROP.  
We also test whether the identity of the controlling block holder influences the relation between 
EXPROP and changes in firm value. Specifically, we test whether the relation is stronger among firms 
controlled by State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs or Private Entities. Because State Bureaucrats have the closest 
ties with the Chinese government, we conjecture that State Bureaucrats are least likely to be the target of 
regulatory action aimed at reducing expropriation. Consequently, we conjecture that, among firms that 
                                                 
11
 We have estimated both models over longer periods of 500 and 750 trading days, and have extended model (2) by 
including the world market index. The results are robust to these changes. 
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have substantial related-party transactions, the beneficial effects of the new regulations is smallest for 
minority shareholders in listed firms controlled by State Bureaucrats. Similarly, because Private Entities 
have the weakest links with the government, we conjecture that minority shareholders of listed firms 
controlled by Private Entities will gain most from the new regulations. 
In our second set of cross-sectional tests, we use several more indirect proxies of the likelihood of 
minority shareholder expropriation. In these tests, we focus on the hypothesis that shareholders of firms 
with weak governance are more reliant upon legal and regulatory protection from expropriation by 
controlling block holders than are shareholders of firms with strong governance (Klapper and Love 
(2003)). Therefore, shareholders of firms with weak corporate governance should benefit 
disproportionately from the new regulations.  
As proxies for the quality of firm-specific corporate governance, we use: the cash-flow rights of 
the controlling shareholder, the type of controlling shareholder (“STATE BUREAUCRAT,” “MOSOE,” 
and “PRIVATE ENTITY”), the dominance of the controlling shareholder (“NON-CONTROLLING 
BLOCK HOLDERS”) and the presence of foreign shareholders (“B-SHARES”). In addition, we include 
dummy variables that indicate whether the CEO is the Chairman of the Board (“CEO IS CHAIR”) and 
whether or not the firm has at least one independent director (“INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR”). 
C. Related-Party Transactions and Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Cheung et al. (2006, 2007) classify related-party transactions into: i) transactions that are a priori 
likely to result in expropriation of the listed firm’s minority shareholders; ii) transactions likely to benefit 
the listed firm’s minority shareholders; and iii) strategic transactions that are, perhaps, not expropriation. 
Our direct, firm-specific measure of expropriation—EXPROP—is defined as the sum of the values of all 
transactions likely to result in expropriation of minority shareholders for each firm in 1999, scaled by the 
market capitalization of the firm as of the end of 1999.12  
                                                 
12
 A list of the various types of related-party transactions is available from the authors on request. In calculating 
EXPROP, we exclude related-party transactions that are potentially beneficial to the firm. We obtain similar results 
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We hypothesize that, during the event windows, firms with high expropriation (proxied by high 
values of EXPROP) outperform firms with low expropriation (proxied by low values of EXPROP).13  To 
test this hypothesis, we use a portfolio time-series regression, which is designed to deal with the 
econometric problem that arises when there is cross-correlation in the firm return processes from which 
the CARs are estimated.  Cross-correlation is likely in our setting because, for each event, the event date 
and event windows are identical across sample firms. The portfolio time-series regression provides 
unbiased estimates of the coefficients along with standard errors that fully account for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and cross-security dependence (see Sefcik and Thompson (1986)).14  
We implement the portfolio time-series approach by forming a portfolio that is long in high-
EXPROP firms and short in low-EXPROP firms. We define high-EXPROP firms as those in the highest 
EXPROP tercile and low-EXPROP firms as those in the lowest EXPROP tercile. As a test of robustness, 
we also show results for portfolios based upon the lower half (lowest fifth) and upper half (highest fifth) 
of the EXPROP distribution. We hypothesize that the regulatory changes are more beneficial for firms 
with high expropriation than for firms with low expropriation.  In other words, we expect our portfolio to 
have positive abnormal returns during the event periods. To control for market risk, we include the return 
on an equally weighted portfolio of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges:  
(3) R(HIGH-EXPROP
 t )–R(LOW-EXPROP t )=β0+Σ β J EVENT J +β4 MARKET RETURN t + ε t  
 
where:  
                                                                                                                                                             
if we use alternative definitions of potentially beneficial transactions, if we use the unscaled value of related-party 
transactions, and if we scale by total assets or total revenue. 
13
 This hypothesis rests on the assumption that investors are able to identify and discount firms with a high level of 
expropriation. In the results section, we present evidence that strongly supports this assumption. 
14
 The problems of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence can, in principle, also be addressed in a 
generalized-least-squares (GLS) regression. Several studies, however, show that GLS tests are highly sensitive to 
errors in specifying the abnormal return model. (See, for example, Chandra and Balachandran (1990)).  
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 R (HIGH-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest third 
(half, fifth) firms based upon EXPROP; 
R (LOW-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest third 
(half, fifth) firms based upon EXPROP; 
β J, J = 1 to 3, give the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the 
high-EXPROP and low-EXPROP portfolios during each event window J; and 
MARKET RETURN t, EVENT J and ε t are defined as above. 
As before, we estimate the model over a period of 250 trading days that ends one day after the newspaper 
release of asset transfer regulation (Event 3). 
D. Ownership Structure and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Following La Porta et al. (2002), we assume that the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder has 
effective control over a firm. We consider three variables that might mitigate the incentive of the 
controlling shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders and positively impact a firm’s value. 
First, the incentive to expropriate outside investors is moderated by the cash-flow ownership of 
the controlling shareholder (see La Porta et al. (2002) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002)). The 
greater are the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, the smaller is the difference in her cash-flow 
and control rights (where we assume that the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder has effective 
control). Hence, we expect the beneficial effect of the regulation for minority shareholders to decrease 
with the cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. Our empirical model includes a dummy variable 
CASH-FLOW RIGHTS > 30% that assumes a value of one if the largest shareholder owns more than 
30% of all shares outstanding, and zero otherwise.15  
Second, we define a variable that measures the control rights of the non-controlling block holders.  
NON-CONTROLLING BLOCK HOLDERS is equal to the sum of the shareholdings of the second 
                                                 
15
 We would have preferred to use data on cash-flow rights and control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. 
Unfortunately this data for listed firms in China is only available from year-end 2002.  
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through tenth largest shareholder. Lins (2003) finds that large, non-management block holders can act as 
a partial substitute for weak institutional governance mechanisms. We expect the ability of the largest 
shareholder to expropriate firm value decreases as the relative shareholdings of block holders with the 
ability and incentive to monitor the actions of the largest block holder increase (see, for example, 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)).  
Third, we include a dummy variable B-SHARE that is equal to one for firms having both A- and 
B-shares outstanding and equal to zero for all other firms. Some Chinese firms offer two classes of shares: 
Class-A shares, which can only be held by domestic investors, and Class-B shares, which can only be 
held by foreign investors.16 Most Class-B shareholders are international financial institutions, whereas 
most Class-A shareholders are individual investors, with only limited ownership by domestic financial 
institutions (see Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004)). In addition, firms with only Class-A shares use 
Chinese accounting rules (PRC GAAP) to prepare their financial statements, whereas firms with Class-A 
and Class-B shares report their results based on both PRC GAAP and International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). In general, IAS are regarded as providing superior transparency as compared to PRC GAAP 
(World Bank (2002)).  Given these differences, we expect that controlling shareholders of firms with 
Class-B shares are less likely to expropriate minority shareholders. 
We also include a variable that indicates whether the largest owner of the listed firm is a State 
Bureaucrat (“STATE BUREAUCRAT”), a MOSOE (“MOSOE”) or a Private Entity (“PRIVATE 
ENTITY”). As discussed before, the type of controlling block holder is important because it might proxy 
for the likelihood of regulatory action in case of expropriation by the controlling block holder. We expect 
regulators are most likely to pursue expropriation by private controlling block holders and least likely to 
pursue State Bureaucrat controlling block holders. 
                                                 
16
 On February 19, 2001, the CSRC announced that Chinese citizens would be allowed to hold and trade Class-B 
shares. 
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 Finally, we include dummy variables that equal one when the Chief Executive Officer is the 
Chairman of the Board, (“CEO IS CHAIR”) and when the firm has at least one independent director 
(“INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR”).  
In estimating the association between the cumulative abnormal returns and the ownership 
variables, we include firm size and leverage as controls. FIRM SIZE is defined as the natural log of the 
total assets as per end of 1999. LEVERAGE is the defined as the book value of debt divided by the book 
value of total assets. 
As before, we employ the portfolio time-series regression methodology, which involves three 
steps. First, we orthogonalize our nine independent variables so that each has zero correlation with the 
other independent variables. Each of the nine variables is replaced by the residual from a regression of 
that variable on an intercept and the other eight independent variables. Second, for each of the nine 
orthogonalized variables, we construct a portfolio that is short on firms in the lowest third (half, fifth) and 
long on firms in the highest third (half, fifth) of the orthogonalized variable’s distribution. Third, we 
regress the returns for each of the nine portfolios on the market return and a dummy variable (EVENTS), 
using the following model:17  
(4)   R (OV-HIGH t)  – R (OV-LOW t) = β0 +  β 1  EVENTS  + β 2  MARKET RETURN t + ε t   
 
where:  
 OV is one of nine orthogonalized variables—CASH-FLOW RIGHTS > 30% i, NON-
CONTROLLING BLOCK HOLDERS i, B-SHARES i, MOSOE i, PRIVATE ENTITY i, CEO IS 
CHAIR i, INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR i, FIRM SIZE i or LEVERAGE i) 
R (OV-HIGH t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest third (half, 
fifth) firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV;  
                                                 
17
 We combine the three event-dummy variables (EVENT 1, EVENT 2, and EVENT3) into one dummy variable 
(EVENTS) that equals 1 / 44 during each day of the three event windows to increase the power of our tests. Results 
from analyzing each of the three events separately are available from the authors.  
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R (OV-LOW t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest third (half, 
fifth) firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV; 
EVENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 / 44 for the dates within the three long event 
windows, and 1 / 30 for the dates within the three 5-day event windows;  
β
 1 gives the estimated difference in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the high-OV and 
low-OV portfolios during the three event windows; and 
MARKET RETURN t and ε t are defined as above. 
As before, the model is estimated over a period of 250 trading days that ends July 25, 2001. 
E. Data 
The data used in this study include information on accounting values, stock prices and ownership 
structure.  We obtained accounting data and data on related-party transactions from the CSMAR/GTA 
database for 918 companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchanges as of year-end 1999. We also obtained 
information on the number of independent directors, and the identity of the CEO and Chairman of the 
Board from CSMAR/GTA. We obtained daily share-price information for each of our sample firms from 
Datastream. Classification of the ten largest shareholders into State Bureaucrats, MOSOES, and Private 
Entities is based on Delios et al. (2006).18  
From our initial sample of 918 firms, we delete 19 firms that are cross-listed on overseas 
exchanges (see footnote 8). We delete 2 firms for which we can not obtain sufficient information on the 
shareholdings of the largest 10 shareholders. Finally, we define 23 separate industry sectors at the level of 
two-digit standard industrial classification, which we obtained from the CSRC. To obtain reliable 
estimates of industry-adjusted Q for our sample firms, we delete 10 firms from our sample where there 
are fewer than five firms in the industry. The three sets of deletions leave us with a final sample of 887 
firms.   
                                                 
18
 The data are available from http://www.bschool.nus.edu.sg/staff/bizakd/owner.htm. 
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V. Results 
     A. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the related-party transactions and shows that, 
in 1999, a total of 6,113 related-party transactions were recorded in the annual reports of our sample 
firms. Following Cheung et al. (2006, 2007), we classify 495 of these transactions as potentially 
beneficial for the listed company because it received cash, loans or guarantees from the related party. 
These transactions include fund transactions, guarantees or pledges and donations where the direction of 
the transaction is from the related party to the firm.19 
    INSERT TABLE 1  
We classify the remaining 5,618 transactions as potentially harmful. Overall, the beneficial 
transactions have a value of RMB 39.77 billion whereas the harmful transactions have a value of RMB 
296.34 billion.20 Within the harmful transactions, the most numerous category involves sale or purchase 
of commodities (2,644) which also accounts for most of the aggregate value (RMB 211.22 billion or 
71.5%); there also were 583 transactions involving provision of services, with a total value of RMB 13.76 
billion or 4.7% and 540 transactions involving the purchase, transfer or swap of assets, with a total value 
of RMB 15.69 billion or 5.3%. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for EXPROP—our expropriation proxy—which 
we calculate as the aggregate value of harmful related-party transactions for each firm during 1999 (2001) 
divided by the firm’s year-end 1999 (2001) market capitalization. For the full sample, the mean and 
median values of EXPROP for 1999 were 5.6% and 1.9%, respectively. In 2001, the corresponding values 
were 5.5% and 1.6%.  For the total sample, there is an insignificant decrease in the mean value of 
                                                 
19
 A detailed description of the different types of related-party transactions is available from the authors on request. 
20
 Cheung et al. (2007) analyze related-party transactions between Chinese listed firms and their State-owned block 
holders during 2001-2002.  
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EXPROP between 1999 and 2001 (t-statistic is -0.3).21 In the last two columns of Panel B, Table 1, we 
report the proportion of firms with an increase in EXPROP from 1999 to 2001, and the z-statistic of the 
test of the null hypothesis that this proportion is 50%. For the whole sample, this proportion is 46.6%, 
which is significantly (at the 10% level) different from 50%.   
The second part of Panel B shows the mean values of EXPROP for our three groups of 
controlling block holders—State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs and Private Entities. We also report the average 
quintile rank for each ownership type (ranks range from 0 for firms in the lowest quintile of the EXPROP 
distribution to 1 for firms in the highest quintile of the EXPROP distribution). In 1999, the highest mean 
value and the highest mean rank are observed at MOSOEs, whereas the lowest mean and the lowest mean 
rank are observed at State Bureaucrats. In 2001, MOSOEs retain the highest mean and the highest mean 
rank; however the lowest mean of EXPROP is now observed at Private Entities. The t-statistics indicate 
that the increase in the mean rank of EXPROP is statistically significant only for State Bureaucrats. 
However, consistent with the idea that State Bureaucrats were least responsive to the new regulation and 
that Private Entities were most responsive to the new regulations, we find that 55.5% of the State 
Bureaucrats had an increase in EXPROP, whereas for both MOSOEs and Private Entities less than 45% 
of the firms experienced an increase in EXPROP. The differences in these proportions are significant at 
the 1% level (not reported). 
In the last two rows of Panel B in Table 1, we report the p-value from the test of whether the 
differences in EXPROP and ∆EXPROP between the three ownership types are significant.  When we use 
the values of EXPROP and ∆EXPROP, the differences are not statistically significant; however, when we 
use the ranks, we find that the difference in EXPROP between the three ownership types is significant 
                                                 
21
 Using the aggregate value of harmful related-party transactions for each firm during 1999 (2001) divided by the 
firm’s year-end 1999 (2001) value of total assets, the mean value of EXPROP in 1999 is 15.1%, and the mean value 
of EXPROP in 2001 is 13.8%. This difference of 1.3% is significant at the 10% level. 
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both before and after the regulatory changes. We also find that there are significant differences between 
the ownership types in terms of the change in the mean rank, again suggesting that State Bureaucrats were 
least responsive to the new regulation and that Private Entities were most responsive to the new 
regulations.22 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our analysis variables both for the entire sample of 887 
firms and for three groups of firms ranked into terciles based on the level of our expropriation proxy 
EXPROP (the sum of the value of all the potentially harmful related-party transactions that took place in 
1999, scaled by the market value of the firm as of December 1999). The last column presents the p-value 
of a t-test that the means are the same for the group with low EXPROP and the group with high EXPROP.   
    INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 shows a negative association between industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and EXPROP, 
suggesting that investors do discount firms that are exposed to more expropriation by the controlling 
block holder. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is measured as of year-end 1999 and is calculated as the sum of 
the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. We 
control for differences in Q across industries by calculating the median Q for each industry and then by 
subtracting the appropriate industry median from each firm’s Q. The average industry-adjusted Q for the 
high-EXPROP group is −0.25, whereas the average industry-adjusted Q for the low-EXPROP group is 
1.04. This difference is significant at the 1% level.  
There is no significant relation between LEVERAGE and EXPROP, but firms with higher 
EXPROP are significantly larger in terms of total assets.  
Firms with a high level of expropriation are more likely to have a MOSOE as controlling block 
holder and are less likely to have a State Bureaucrat as controlling block holder. There is no significant 
                                                 
22
 The conclusions do not change when we measure the relevant variables over a two-year period before the 
regulation and a two-year period after the regulations. 
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difference in the likelihood of having a Private Entity as controlling block holder for firms in the low-
EXPROP and high-EXPROP groups.  
Contrary to our expectations, but consistent with Cheung et al. (2007), we find that high-
EXPROP firms are more likely to have controlling block holders that own more than 30% of the shares. 
Cheung et al. (2007) argue that expropriation is concentrated in listed firms with the highest state 
ownership because these are firms where the managers of the SOEs might find it easiest to carry out 
connected transactions.  Consistent with this explanation, non-controlling block holders own a larger 
percentage of the shares of firms that have low expropriation than of firms with a high level of 
expropriation.  
Surprisingly, low-expropriation firms are more likely to have the same person as CEO and 
Chairman of the Board. There is no significant difference between the low- and high-expropriation groups 
in the proportion of firms with independent directors or the proportion of firms with B-shares.  
B. Market-Wide Impact of the Regulations 
As detailed in section 3.A, we use standard event-study methodology to obtain mean-adjusted and 
market-adjusted abnormal returns around the announcements of each regulatory change.  In Table 3, we 
present the results of this analysis.  In Columns 2 and 3, we present results using the Long Event 
Windows, whereas, in Columns 4 and 5, we present the results using the Five-day Event Windows. For 
each of the three events, Columns 2 and 4 present cumulative mean-adjusted returns and Columns 3 and 5 
present cumulative market-adjusted returns, where we use a portfolio of Chinese firms that trade on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (“HKSE”) in an attempt to control for market-wide movements unrelated to 
the regulatory events. 
    INSERT TABLE 3 
In Column 2 of Table 3, we see that the cumulative mean-adjusted return for the 11-day Long 
Event Window around the announcement of the shareholder-meeting regulation is a positive 10.1%. This 
increase in the market’s market value is significant at better than the five- percent level (p-value = 0.03). 
Around the announcements of the ban of related guarantees and the restriction on asset transfers, the 
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cumulative mean-adjusted returns are positive 1.1% and positive 1.9%, respectively, but these abnormal 
returns are not significantly different from zero. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that the correlation between 
the market return and the return on the portfolio of Chinese firms that trade on the HKSE is low, and that, 
consequently, the cumulative market-adjusted returns are very similar to the cumulative mean-adjusted 
returns shown in Column 2. Moreover, when we use Five-day Event Windows, the results are largely 
unchanged. 
It is instructive to relate our estimates of the market’s reaction to the new regulations to other 
research in this area. In a cross-country setting, La Porta et al. (2002) find that a two-point improvement 
in the score on the anti-director rights index raises Tobin’s Q by 0.2, or about 17% of the 1.27 sample 
median. (Two points is the difference between the common-law and civil-law medians). In a study of 
Russian firms, Black (1999) reports that a one standard-deviation increase in governance ranking is 
associated with an eight-fold increase in firm value.  
Given the substantial annual volume of related-party transactions—the average value of EXPROP 
was equal to 5.6% of market value in 1999 (as shown in Panel B of Table 1)—this evidence also suggests 
that effective regulation could have a dramatic impact on the discount in firm value associated with 
expected future expropriation. Consistent with this observation, Table 2 reports a difference in industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q between firms in the low- and high-expropriation terciles of 1.3, or almost 250% of 
the 0.519 sample mean.  
Even though the total increase in the value of the market around the three regulatory changes is 
substantial (around 13%), the high volatility in the Chinese stock market, combined with the long event 
windows, make it difficult to discern significant price reactions to market-wide events. An additional 
problem is the presence of several confounding events. The most significant confounding events were 
during the first event window: on May 19, the opening of a second board was announced, as was the 
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opening of the market to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII).23 It is important to note that 
these confounding events do not affect the cross-sectional results to the extent that the impact of these 
events on stock prices is not related to the level of expropriation or the quality of corporate governance.  
In the next section, we investigate whether there is evidence of cross-sectional differences in 
share price reaction based on differences along these two dimensions.  
C. Related Party Transactions and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs  
This section presents the results of our cross-sectional tests based on EXPROP.24 In Table 4, we 
report the results from estimating eq. (3)—our tests for difference in the CARs of the portfolio of the high 
and low expropriation firms.  For each of the three regulatory changes, Panel A of Table 4 reports the 
results based on splitting the full sample into three groups based upon the value of EXPROP. In Panels 
B1 – B3 of Table 4, we present the results when the sample is further split based on the ownership type of 
the largest share holder. Finally, Panel C of Table 4 reports the cumulative abnormal returns for the hedge 
portfolio cumulated across all three events when the full sample is split into two, three and five groups 
based on the value of EXPROP. 
    INSERT TABLE 4 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the high-EXPROP portfolio outperforms the low-EXPROP 
portfolio for each of the three events, and that this outperformance is significant at the one-percent level 
for the shareholder-meeting regulation and the asset-transfer regulation, and the ten-percent level for the 
related-guarantee regulation. Around the announcement of the new shareholder-meeting rules, the 
portfolio of firms in the high-EXPROP tercile outperformed the portfolio of firms in the low-EXPROP 
                                                 
23
 When we exclude May 19 from our event window, the abnormal return around the first event is around 8%. For 
all four models, CARs are significant at the 5% level. 
24
 The validity of EXPROP as measure of firm-specific expropriation is confirmed in a cross-sectional regression, 
where we find a negative and statistically significant relation between EXPROP and Tobin’s Q, after controlling for 
several corporate governance and firm characteristics. The results of this analysis are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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tercile by 3.5%. Around the announcement of the ban of related guarantees, this difference is 1.8%; and 
around the announcement of the tighter rules on asset transfers, the difference is 5.2%. If we sum across 
the three events, the total out-performance of the high-EXPROP group over the low-EXPROP group is 
more than ten percentage points. 
Panels B1 – B3 of Table 4 present the CARs around the three regulatory events for different 
groups based on the identity of the controlling block holder (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE or Private Entity). 
More specifically, for the stocks in each ownership group, we form zero-cost portfolios that are long the 
tercile of high-expropriation stocks and short the tercile of low-expropriation stocks. For State 
Bureaucrats, there is no evidence that high-EXPROP firms significantly outperform low-EXPROP firms 
around the announcements of the new regulations. For the group of MOSOEs, the out-performance of 
high-EXPROP firms relative to low-EXPROP firms is positive for all events and significant at the 5% 
level for the shareholder meeting and asset transfer events. The most noticeable out-performance of high-
EXPROP firms relative to low-EXPROP firms is observed for the group of firms controlled by Private 
Entities. The CAR around each of the events is significant at the 5%-level and the total CAR across all 
three events is 18.2%. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that the regulation is likely to be 
perceived as more (less) effective for firms where the controlling block holder has weaker (stronger) ties 
with the government. 
In Panel C of Table 4, we report the cumulative abnormal return where we cumulate across all 
three regulatory events, for portfolios that are long in HIGH-EXPROP firms and short in LOW-EXPROP 
firms. The results in the first (second/third) column are based on portfolios where the HIGH-EXPROP 
firms are those in the highest EXPROP half (third/fifth) and LOW-EXPROP firms are those in the lowest 
EXPROP half (third/fifth). For the full sample and also for the subsamples of MOSOEs and Private 
Entities, the cumulative abnormal return on the hedge portfolio increases if the portfolio contains stocks 
with more extreme values of EXPROP. For the total sample, the CAR increases from 7.4% to 11.7% 
when we move from two groups to five groups. For MOSOEs, the CAR is 9.0% when we split the sample 
in two groups, and 15.1% when we split the sample into five groups. Finally, for Private Entities, the 
  - 26 - 
CAR across all three events equals 10.4% when we split the sample into two groups and equals 20.3% 
when we split the sample into five groups. 
To summarize, our results suggest that the market found the three regulations to be credible 
attempts at improving corporate governance of Chinese firms. For each of the three events, we find large 
and statistically significant differences in the reactions of firms with high and low levels of expropriation, 
even though, as shown in Table 3, the market-wide reaction was positive but not significantly different 
from zero for the related-guarantee and asset-transfer events.  Our evidence also shows the regulations 
were perceived to be ineffective for firms with controlling block holders with the closest ties to the 
government. 
D. Other Governance Proxies and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
In the previous section, we demonstrated significant cross-sectional differences in the share price 
reactions of firms with high and low levels of expropriation as proxied by the total value of potentially 
harmful related-party transactions in the year before the regulations were announced.  In this section, we 
provide additional evidence on cross-sectional differences in the share-price reactions of firms classified 
into low- and high-governance portfolios using seven traditional corporate governance proxies, including 
the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder, the shareholding of non controlling shareholders, the 
presence of B-shares and the type of controlling shareholder.  
The results from estimating our portfolio time-series models appear in Table 5. We present the 
results from the time-series model, equation (4), based upon three portfolios: long on the high-third 
(half/fifth) and short on the low-third (half/fifth) of firms based upon each orthogonalized explanatory 
variable.  We present the results using both our Long Event Windows and our Five-Day Event Windows. 
Because the results are generally consistent across the six alternative specifications (two windows times 
three groupings), we focus our discussion primarily on the results based upon three groups of firms using 
the Long Event Windows.  
   INSERT TABLE 5 
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First, we find weak evidence that suggests CARs tend to be lower for firms where the cash-flow 
rights of the largest shareholder are higher than 30% (CASH-FLOW RIGHTS >30%).25 Firms in the 
lowest third for this variable outperform the firms in the highest third by a statistically significant 2.7%. 
Similar results are obtained when we split the sample into two groups and when we use the five-day 
windows, but the CAR is insignificant when we split the sample into five groups. We conclude that there 
is only weak evidence that minority shareholders in firms where the largest shareholder has greater 
ownership benefit less from the regulations relative to those where the largest shareholder has less 
ownership.26  
Second, we consistently find a negative and significant relationship between the CARs and our 
NON-CONTROLLING BLOCK HOLDERS variable. Firms with larger holdings by the non-controlling 
block holders experienced significantly smaller increases in value around the announcement of the new 
regulations than firms with smaller shareholding by non-controlling block holders. The total difference in 
the cumulative abnormal return around the three events between the high- and low-tercile portfolios is 
5.9%, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Third, there is no significant relation between MOSOE and the CARs. This result is inconsistent 
with the notion that minority shareholders in market-oriented SOEs are more likely to benefit because the 
regulator is more likely to enforce the new regulations when a MOSOE is the controlling block holder 
than when a State Bureaucrat is the controlling block holder. 27 However, we do find that firms controlled 
                                                 
25
 Note that we can split our sample into thirds based upon a dummy variable because it has been orthogonalized 
against the other eight explanatory variables, rendering it semi-continuous. 
26
 Similar results are obtained if we use different cut-offs (20%, 40%), or actual ownership. 
27
 Note that the results in Table 5 are based on a multivariate analysis and cannot be directly compared with those in 
Table 4. When we form a portfolio that is long MOSOEs and short State Bureaucrats, we find that MOSOEs 
outperform State Bureaucrats by 2.5% (t-statistic = 2.2) on the announcement of the regulations. Because MOSOEs 
are larger and less levered, this results in a less significant result for the MOSOE portfolio when we include these 
control variables. 
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by Private Entities have larger price increases around the introduction of the regulations. This is 
supportive of the idea that private controlling block holders are more likely to expropriate than State 
owners, as they actually receive cash flows from the firm, whereas cash flows of shares ultimately owned 
by the State accrue to the taxpayer rather than to the government bureaucrats who exercise the State’s 
control rights. The result is also consistent with the idea that the regulator is more likely to enforce the 
regulations in case of expropriation by a private block holder. The total difference in the cumulative 
abnormal return around the three events between the highest and lowest tercile portfolios is 4.7% and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Fourth, the presence of foreign shareholders (B-SHARES) has a negative effect on the abnormal 
return for the three announcements. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that controlling 
shareholders of firms with foreign shareholders are less likely to expropriate minority shareholders 
because of the greater transparency and greater sophistication of these minority shareholders. The total 
difference in CARs around the three events between the highest and lowest tercile portfolios is 8.6%, 
statistically significant at better than the 1% level. 
There is no consistent evidence that shareholders in firms where the CEO is also the Chairman of 
the Board benefited from the new regulations. Using the Long Event Windows, the results suggest that 
shareholders in firms without independent directors benefit from the new regulations. However, when we 
use Five-Day Event Windows, the CARs are insignificant.  We conclude that minority shareholders do not 
perceive themselves to be more at risk of expropriation at firms where the CEO also wears the 
Chairman’s hat and at firms without independent directors. 
Other results in Table 5 show that the CARs around the announcements are not related to 
leverage. This result is consistent with the idea that creditors in China play a very limited role in the 
governance of firms. The four largest banks in China control the majority of banking assets in the country 
and are directly controlled by the Chinese government. These banks typically allocate credit to individual 
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firms on the basis of national policy rather than on financial condition or performance, and typically are 
not involved in active monitoring.28  
The CAR is positively related to FIRM SIZE, indicating that larger firms benefited relatively 
more from the new regulations than smaller firms. This result is consistent with our finding in Table 2 
that larger firms are engaged in more related party transactions (scaled by market capitalization) than 
small firms.  
Overall, our results suggest that firms with higher levels of expropriation (proxied by several 
variables that have been used as indicators of the quality of corporate governance) benefited more from 
the regulations than firms with lower levels of expropriation.    
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
Recent studies of corporate ownership around the world show that listed firms typically have 
controlling block holders.  For such firms, the primary concern of corporate governance is the protection 
of minority shareholders from expropriation by a controlling block holder and her management team.  
In this study, we examine whether securities-market regulations intended to improve minority 
shareholder protection in China—a civil-law transitional economy with poorly developed institutions—
can be effective. Our results suggest that they can—at least for firms that do not have close ties to the 
government. We find that firms with higher levels of expropriation from minority shareholders 
disproportionately benefit from the regulations relative to firms with lower levels of expropriation from 
minority shareholders (whether proxied by a direct measure of expropriation based on the total value of 
related party transactions, or  measures of firm-specific corporate governance such as the relative power 
of the largest shareholder, the presence of foreign shareholders and other corporate governance related 
variables).  
                                                 
28
 In a study by the World Bank, the authors observe that “creditors are among the least effective instruments of 
corporate control in China” (World Bank (2002), p. xvi) 
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We also report evidence that suggests effectiveness of the new regulations is highest for firms 
with private controlling block holders and lowest for firms where the controlling block holder has the 
closest ties with the government. This evidence confirms the importance of political connections, as it 
suggests that Chinese minority shareholders expect the regulator to enforce the regulations when a private 
block holder engages in expropriation but not when State controlled entities engage in expropriation.  
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Appendix 1:  
Chinese Regulatory Changes Occurring During the First Quarter of 2000 
 
On May 18, 2000, the CRSC released a new regulation regarding the procedures for shareholder meetings, 
while emphasizing that all corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to conduct proper shareholder meetings. The 
new regulation was publicly announced on May 26, 2000.29 The most important improvements in terms of minority 
investor protection are: 
 
i) Shareholders who hold, separately or jointly, more than five percent of the voting power may 
propose motions for discussion at the shareholders’ Annual General Meeting. 
ii) When the meeting votes on associated trading, shareholders involved in the associated trading 
shall not participate in the voting, and their rights to vote shall not be counted among the 
aggregate shares possessing voting rights. 
iii) When a motion concerning the election of directors and members of the supervisory board is 
discussed at the shareholders’ meeting, shareholders shall vote on the candidate for director or 
supervisor individually. 
iv) When disputes occur concerning the assembling and convening of a meeting, voting procedures, 
or the legitimacy and effectiveness of a resolution, the parties concerned can take legal action in 
a People’s Court in order to resolve the dispute. 
 
On June 6, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation prohibiting listed firms from issuing loan guarantees 
to their shareholders, shareholders’ subsidiaries, and individuals. In addition, if the firm should issue a loan 
guarantee to an unrelated party, it should obtain a mutual guarantee to control risk, and the firm’s managers are 
prohibited from signing a loan guarantee contract without approval of the board, or approval at a shareholders’ 
meeting. This regulation was first publicly reported in Chinese newspapers on June 15, 2000. 
 
On June 26, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation regarding reorganizations of listed companies. The 
regulation, which was published in the newspapers on July 24, 2000, stipulates that if gross (net) assets are acquired 
or sold that account for more than 50% of the latest audited gross (net) assets of the listed company, or the profit 
from acquired or sold assets account for more than 50% of the latest audited profit of the listed company, then the 
listed company shall perform the following procedures: 
 
i) The board of directors shall conduct a feasibility study and disclose the information as if it was a 
public offering. 
ii) The board shall hire accounting and law firms qualified to conduct securities business to certify 
the relevant issues. 
iii) The board shall issue a resolution on the relevant issues and report to the Stock Exchange within 
two days after the resolution is made, and announce to the public the resolution with the comments 
of the intermediaries and the board of supervisors. 
iv) Upon examination and approval of the shareholders meeting, the listed company shall implement 
the plan of asset purchase or sale. 
v) If the counter-party has a tacit understanding with the controlling shareholder of the listed 
company, the transaction shall be deemed an affiliated transaction, which shall be subject to the 
relevant rules and regulations. 
vi) After the major purchase or sale of assets, the listed company shall ensure the separation of 
personnel, assets and accounting from its controlling shareholder.  
 
                                                 
29
 Before publication in the newspapers, the regulatory changes were first released to a limited number of market 
participants: the securities regulatory offices, the stock exchanges and the listed companies. 
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TABLE 1:  
Related-Party Transactions of Chinese listed firms in 1999 
Panel A presents frequency and average value of the different types of related-party transactions for 887 
Chinese listed firms in 1999. (Source: the GTA/CSMAR Related-Party Transactions Database). 
Transactions are classified as potentially beneficial for the listed company if the listed firm received cash, 
loans or guarantees from the related party; all other related-party transactions are classified as harmful. A 
detailed description of each type of related-party transaction is available from the authors.  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the variable EXPROP
 i, which is the sum of the value of 
potentially harmful related-party transactions in 1999 (2001), scaled by the market value of firm i as of 
year-end 1999 (2001). We winsorize EXPROP
 i at the 99 percentile. STATE BUREAUCRAT is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; PRIVATE 
ENTITY is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Classifications 
are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established researchers at the National 
University of Singapore as described in Delios et al. (2006). The t-statistic in Panel B tests whether 
∆EXPROP is statistically different from zero, and the z-statistic in the last column tests whether the 
proportion of firms with an increase in ∆EXPROP is statistically different from 0.50. The p-values in the 
last two rows are based on tests of equality of means (medians) across the three classifications of the 
largest block holder. 
 
Transaction Observations Mean Value (in million RMB)
Beneficial 495 80.34
Harmful 5,618 52.75
Detailed Classification of Harmful Related Party Transactions
Observations Mean value  % of total
Commodity 2,644 79.89 71.5
Asset 540 29.06 5.3
Services 583 23.60 4.7
Commission 165 47.72 2.7
Fund Transfer 420 27.24 3.9
Guarantee 360 43.36 5.3
Lease 402 16.08 2.2
Operating trust 33 9.22 0.1
Non-Monetary Transaction 2 0.00 0.0
Stock Transaction 203 43.74 3.0
Debt Transaction 34 42.88 0.5
Cooperative Project 67 36.92 0.8
R&D 34 0.73 0.0
Manager Remuneration 22 9.60 0.1
License 81 0.44 0.0
Other Events 28 32.01 0.3
 
Panel A: Related Party Transactions for Chinese firms in 1999
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EXPROP 1999 EXPROP 2001 ∆EXPROP  t-stat % + z-stat
All Mean 0.056 0.055 -0.001 -0.3 46.6 1.9
Median 0.019 0.016 -0.004
STATE BUREAUCRAT
 Mean 0.043 0.049 0.006 0.7 55.5 1.5
Mean rank 0.381 0.439 0.058 2.5
MOSOE 
 Mean 0.062 0.059 -0.003 -0.6 44.4 -2.6
Mean rank 0.545 0.527 -0.017 -1.1
PRIVATE ENTITY
 Mean 0.052 0.044 -0.008 -1.0 41.6 -1.4
Mean rank 0.489 0.461 -0.028 -0.5
Equality of means: p-value 0.09 0.34 0.50
Equality of ranks: p-value 0.01 0.01 0.03
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for EXPROP 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: 
Sample Descriptive Statistics by Expropriation Terciles 
The sample consists of 887 publicly traded Chinese firms, segmented into three terciles based upon the sum of the value of potentially harmful related-party 
transactions in 1999, scaled by the market value of the firm as of December 1999. Q is a proxy for Tobin’s Q, measured as the sum of the market value of equity 
and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets measured as of year-end 1999. INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED Q is industry-adjusted Q, where we 
control for differences in Q across industries by calculating the median Q for each industry and then subtracting the appropriate industry median from each firm’s 
Q. FIRM SIZE is a firm’s total assets expressed in millions of RMB.  LEVERAGE is the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets as of year-
end 1999.  STATE BUREAUCRAT is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; PRIVATE ENTITY is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
largest block holder is classified as a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the 
National University of Singapore as described in Delios et al. (2006).  CASH FLOW RIGHTS > 30% is a binary variable that is equal to one if the largest 
shareholder owns more than 30% of all outstanding shares and 0 otherwise. NON-CONTROLLING BLOCK HOLDERS is the sum of the shareholdings of the 
second through tenth largest shareholders. B-SHARES is a binary variable that is equal to one for firms that have both A- and B-shares outstanding and equal to 
zero otherwise. CEO IS CHAIR is a binary variable that is equal to one if the Chief Executive Officer is also the Chairman of the Board and zero otherwise, and 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the firm has at least one independent director and zero otherwise.  For each 
variable identified in the first column, the last two columns report the difference in the means of firms in terciles one and three, followed by the corresponding p-
value.  
All
Min Max Mean Low Medium High Low - High p-value
INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED Q -3.822 16.772 0.519 1.036 0.773 -0.249 1.285 0.001
FIRM SIZE 5,884 2,703,343 146,473            103,692           122,353            213,230           109,538-              0.001
LEVERAGE 0.02 1 0.428 0.432 0.420 0.432 0.000 0.986
STATE BUREAUCRAT 0 1 0.239 0.333 0.241 0.141 0.192 0.001
MOSOE 0 1 0.656 0.546 0.669 0.753 -0.208 0.001
PRIVATE ENTITY 0 1 0.096 0.112 0.084 0.091 0.021 0.407
CASH FLOW RIGHTS > 30% 0 1 0.733 0.631 0.757 0.811 -0.180 0.001
NON-CONTROLLING BLOCKHOLDER 0 0.495 0.168 0.191 0.184 0.128 0.063 0.001
B-SHARES 0 1 0.079 0.061 0.088 0.088 -0.027 0.215
CEO IS CHAIR 0 1 0.117 0.149 0.111 0.091 0.058 0.030
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 0 1 0.023 0.024 0.007 0.037 -0.013 0.343
Expropriation
TABLE 3: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Regulatory Events 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcements of three new 
regulations intended to improve corporate governance at Chinese publicly listed firms. The first new 
regulation substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling shareholder; 
and the third improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related parties. We estimate 
CARs using an equally weighted portfolio consisting of all 887 sample firms. The results in column two 
(four) and three (five) are based on eq. (1) and eq. (2), respectively: 
(1) MARKET RETURN t =  β0 + Σ β j  EVENT J  +  ε  t       
(2) MARKET RETURN t =  β0 + Σ β j  EVENT J  +  β5  HK RETURN t + ε  t   
where MARKET RETURN t is the return on an equally weighted market portfolio during day t; EVENT 
J, J = 1 to 3 are dummy variables that equal 1/n for the dates within the event window of length n for the 
first, second and third regulation and equal zero otherwise; HK RETURN t is the return for day t on an 
equally weighted portfolio of 24 Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and β j , J = 1 to 
3 are the estimated cumulative adjusted returns associated with each event window. The model is 
estimated over 250 trading days ending July 25, 2000 (one day after the newspapers published the third 
regulation). The Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading days, respectively, 
and span the period from one day before the initial announcement of the regulation by the CSRC to one 
day after the first publication by the financial press. The Five-Day Event Windows span the five days 
centered on the CSRC announcement and the five days centered on the first publication by the financial 
press. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
Long Event Windows Five-Day Event Windows 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept  
 
0.002 
(1.6) 
0.001 
(1.4) 
0.002 
(1.5) 
0.001 
(1.4) 
 
EVENT 1: 
Shareholder Meeting 
 
0.101 ** 
(2.1)   
0.117 ** 
(2.3) 
0.099 ** 
(2.1) 
0.107 ** 
(2.3) 
 
EVENT 2: 
Related Guarantees 
 
0.011 
(0.2) 
 0.001 
(0.0) 
0.011 
(0.2) 
-0.001 
-(0.0) 
EVENT 3: 
Asset Transfer 
 
0.019 
(0.3) 
0.006 
(0.1) 
0.023 
(0.5) 
0.011 
(0.3) 
     
HK RETURN  
 
0.086**  
(2.0) 
 
0.079* 
(1.9) 
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 TABLE 4: 
Difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Degree of Expropriation 
This table reports on the relation between EXPROP and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Each cell in Panels A 
and B1-B3 presents the difference in the CARs of the HIGH-EXPROP and LOW-EXPROP groups around each of 
the three announcements of new regulations. Panel C reports the cumulative abnormal returns for the hedge portfolio 
cumulated across all three events when the full sample is split into two, three and five groups based on the value of 
EXPROP. The first new regulation substantially increased the rights of minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual 
Shareholders’ Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling 
shareholder; and the third improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related parties.  EXPROP is 
defined as the sum of the value of potentially harmful related-party transactions in 1999, scaled by the market value 
of the firm as of December 1999.  We estimate the following model: 
(3) R (HIGH-EXPROPt ) – R (LOW-EXPROPt ) = β0 + Σ β J  EVENT J + β 5  MARKET RETURN t + ε t  
where:  R (HIGH-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the highest third of firms 
based upon EXPROP; 
R (LOW-EXPROP t) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest third of firms 
based upon EXPROP; 
β J, J = 1 to 3, are the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the HIGH-
EXPROP and LOW-EXPROP portfolios during each event window J;  
The model is estimated over 250 trading days ending July 25, 2000 (one day after the newspapers published the 
third regulation). Panel A presents results from estimating the relation between EXPROP and CARs for the full 
sample while Panel B1-B3 presents the results for three mutually exclusive sub-samples containing only firms 
controlled by State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs or Private Entities.  These results are based upon splitting each sample 
into three groups on the basis of EXPROP. The Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading 
days, respectively, and span the period from one day before the initial announcement of the regulation by the CSRC 
to one day after the first publication by the financial press. The Five-Day Event Windows span the five days centered 
on the CSRC announcement and the five days centered on the first publication by the financial press.  t-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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(1)
Events
Panel A: All Firms
Long Event Windows 0.035 *** 0.018 * 0.052 *** 0.101 ***
(2.9) (1.7) (3.0) (4.1)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.026 ** 0.016 0.024 ** 0.065 ***
(2.2) (1.5) (2.1) (3.2)
Panel B1: STATE BUREAUCRAT
Long Event Windows 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.015
(0.2) (0.7) (0.2) (0.6)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.009 0.009 -0.016 0.002
(0.8) (0.8) (-1.3) (0.1)
Panel B2: MOSOE
Long Event Windows 0.039 ** 0.023 0.052 ** 0.110 ***
(2.4) (1.5) (2.3) (3.3)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.027 * 0.021 0.030 ** 0.078 ***
Panel B3: PRIVATE ENTITY
Long Event Windows 0.065 ** 0.048 ** 0.074 ** 0.182 ***
(2.5) (2.0) (2.0) (3.4)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.041 * 0.045 * 0.037 0.123 ***
(1.7) (1.9) (1.5) (2.8)
Meeting Guarantees Transfers
Shareholder Related Asset All Three
(2) (3) (4) (5)
  41 
Panel C: Total CARs for different groups
All Firms
Long Event Windows 0.074 *** 0.101 *** 0.117 ***
(4.1) (4.1) (3.6)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.047 *** 0.065 *** 0.066 **
(3.1) (3.2) (2.5)
STATE BUREAUCRAT
Long Event Windows 0.032 0.015 0.021
(1.4) (0.6) (0.7)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.018 0.002 -0.016
(0.9) (0.1) (0.0)
MOSOE
Long Event Windows 0.09 *** 0.110 *** 0.151 ***
(3.9) (3.3) (3.2)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.058 *** 0.078 *** 0.092 **
(3.0) (2.9) (2.4)
PRIVATE ENTITY
Long Event Windows 0.104 ** 0.182 *** 0.203 ***
(2.2) (3.4) (3.2)
Five-Day Event Windows 0.069 * 0.123 *** 0.137 ***
(1.9) (2.8) (2.6)
(1) (2) (3)
Low ThirdLow Half Low Fifth
High vs. High vs. High vs. 
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TABLE 5: 
Corporate Governance and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the relation between a set of governance-related variables 
and the cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of three new regulations intended to improve 
corporate governance at Chinese listed firms. The first new regulation substantially increased the rights of 
minority shareholders at a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ Meeting; the second prohibited the issuance of 
loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling shareholder; and the third improved the transparency and 
regulation of asset transfers to related parties.  We use a portfolio time-series regression model to regress 
an event-window dummy on the returns from a portfolio that is long on the highest and short on the 
lowest half/third/fifth of firms based upon orthogonalized explanatory variable OV: (CASH-FLOW 
RIGHTS > 30%, NON-CONTROLLING BLOCK HOLDERS, B-SHARES, MOSOE, PRIVATE 
ENTITY, CEO IS CHAIR, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, FIRM SIZE or LEVERAGE; which are 
defined in Table 2). The model is as follows:  
 
(4)   R (HIGH-OV
 t )  – R (LOW-OV t) = β 0 +  β 1  EVENTS  + β 2  MARKET RETURN t + ε t  
 
where: EVENTS is a dummy variable that equals 1 / 44 for the dates within the three event windows (or 1 
/ 30 for dates within the 5-day event windows), and zero otherwise; R (HIGH-OV t) is the return on the 
HIGH-OV portfolio; R (LOW-OV
 t) is the return on the LOW-OV portfolio; MARKET RETURN t is the 
market return on day t; and ε
 t is an i.i.d. error term. Each cell gives the difference in the CARs of the 
HIGH-OV and LOW-OV Portfolios during the event window around the three regulatory changes. The 
models are estimated over 250 trading days ending July 25, 2000 (one day after the newspapers published 
the third regulation). The Long Event Windows for Events 1, 2 and 3 are 11, 10 and 23 trading days, 
respectively, and span the period from one day before the initial announcement of the regulation by the 
CSRC to one day after first publication by the financial press. The Five-Day Event Windows span the five 
days centered on the CSRC announcement and the five days centered on the first publication by the 
financial press. t-statistics appear in parentheses.  
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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High vs. 
Low Half
High vs. 
Low 
Third
High vs. 
Low 
Fifth
High vs. 
Low Half
High vs. 
Low 
Third
High  
vs. Low 
Fifth
CASH-FLOW RIGHTS > 30% -0.046 *** -0.027 * 0.003 -0.029 ** -0.024 ** -0.012
-(3.1) -(1.8) (0.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(0.8)
NON-CONTROLLING -0.057 *** -0.059 *** -0.052 ** -0.035 ** -0.034 ** -0.029
  BLOCKHOLDERS -(3.2) -(2.8) -(2.2) -(2.4) -(2.0) -(1.5)
MOSOE 0.011 0.011 -0.014 -0.002 0.001 -0.006
(0.9) (0.7) -(0.8) -(0.2) (0.1) -(0.4)
PRIVATE ENTITY 0.047 *** 0.047 *** 0.05 *** 0.023 ** 0.032 ** 0.028 *
(3.2) (3.2) (2.6) (1.9) (2.2) (1.8)
B-SHARES -0.069 ***
-0.086 *** -0.101 *** -0.037 ** -0.04 ** -0.043 *
-(3.5) -(3.5) -(3.3) -(2.2) -(2.1) -(1.7)
CEO IS CHAIR 0.032 *** 0.030 * -0.001 0.015 0.014 -0.001
(2.6) (1.7) -(0.0) (1.5) (1.0) -(0.0)
INDEPENDENT -0.043 ** -0.055
**
-0.054 **
-0.013 -0.022 -0.021
  DIRECTORS -(2.6) -(2.5) -(2.5) -(1.0) -(1.2) -(1.1)
LEVERAGE -0.023 -0.028 -0.033 -0.008 -0.011 -0.016
-(1.4) -(1.3) -(1.2) -(0.6) -(0.6) -(0.7)
FIRM SIZE 0.093 *** 0.129 *** 0.15 *** 0.052 *** 0.068 *** 0.083 ***
(4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (2.9) (2.7) (2.9)
Long Window Five-Day Window
 
 
